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A COMMENT ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
Luke K. Cooperrider* 
T HE recently-published treatise by Professors Harper and James, The Law of Torts, which is the subject of this article is 
no routine publication. It is not a mere recasting in different 
language of an already familiar synthesis; nor is it the kind of 
book one keeps around for casual reference. It is, rather, a state-
ment of a philosophy of tort liability which, by reason of its 
consonance with much of the currently vocal thought in the 
field, and by reason of the powers of analysis and expression that 
the authors have brought to bear, is almost certainly destined to 
be one of those landmark works which occupy a generative rather 
than merely derivative relation to the law. No lawyer who hopes 
to be well informed with regard to current and probable future 
developments in tort law can afford not to examine it, and this 
means examination in the round, not by occasional limited refer-
ence. This is not to imply that he will find such a task burden-
some, for the literary, one might almost say narrative, qualities of 
the book are indeed unusual. Here is a law book with a plot. 
For these reasons, and because it is the work of such eminent 
authors, it is with great trepidation that I venture upon a com-
mentary which, because of my own convictions regarding the 
function and content of tort law and the proper function, in our 
system, of the judges to whom it is entrusted, must be a vigorous 
criticism. This criticism goes not to the authors' interpretation 
of the law as it is, an interpretation which is, in my opinion, both 
accurate and uniquely helpful, but to their belief as to what it 
ought to be, and therefore to the direction which they seek to im-
pose upon future development. The discrepancy between the "is" 
and the "ought" the authors find principally in that segment of the 
law which applies to "accidents." But before encountering this, the 
subject of controversy, I should like to describe briefly and com-
ment upon the treatise as a whole. 
•Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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It is in three volumes. Volume 3 contains a conventional 
index and table of cases, plus a table of statutes and a fifty-page 
bibliography of periodical literature organized in accordance 
with the chapter headings of the treatise. This innovation alone 
would be an extremely valuable addition to the library of any 
lawyer concerned with tort problems. 
The text of the treatise is divided into three "Parts." Reading 
from right to left, "Part Three," entitled "Conflict of Laws" is a 
short chapter which attempts little more than to suggest the choice 
of law problem as it affects tort litigation. It will serve as an effec-
tive memorandum of an issue that may otherwise frequently be 
overlooked. The remaining 950 pages of Volume 2 are occupied by 
"Part Two" of the text, entitled "Accidents," of which more 
later. Volume 1 contains "Part One" which, apparently because 
a title such as "Those Subjects Ordinarily Dealt With in a Treatise 
on Torts Which Are Not Covered in Part Two" is somewhat 
lacking in elegance, the authors have called "Intended Torts." 
In addition to the subjects which are customarily so described this 
part includes chapters on defamation, business torts, misrepresenta-
tion, tort liability as affected by family relationships, recovery for 
emotional disturbances and contributory tortfeasors. 
Part One is a conventional approach to that part of the sub-
ject matter assigned to it. Much of it will be not unfamiliar to 
those who have used Professor Harper's 1933 text. There have been 
added a liberal cross reference to the Restatement and, in the body 
of the text, an occasional quotation from principal cases to throw 
light on judicial attitudes in particular circumstances. In com-
parison to the old Harper, the chapters on Malicious Prosecution, 
Defamation and Misrepresentation have undergone the most ex-
tensive revision, and can be regarded as substantially new treat-
ments. Particularly worthy of notice is the very extensive and 
penetrating analysis of the policy basis of liability in these areas. 
The Malicious Prosecution chapter, for instance, offers1 a com-
parative discussion of malicious prosecution, false arrest and def-
amation-a concordance and rationalization of the three torts 
which should prove most useful to a lawyer who may be uncertain 
which line of thinking to pursue in the case at hand. 
1 Sections 4.11, 4.12. Section and page numbers in this and succeeding footnotes are 
references to HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS, Boston: Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1956. 
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The discussion of the basis of liability for misrepresentation 
also deserves special mention. The authors have made a valiant 
attempt2 to impose a system upon these cases. The system is in-
tellectually attractive enough, and my principal doubt relates to 
its effectiveness as a control. The point is made, and with this it 
seems to me impossible to disagree, that the courts in making use 
of the "misrepresentation as of his own knowledge" technique are 
in fact branding as fraudulent statements which may have been 
honestly and even innocently made. Recognizing this, then, as an 
instrument of strict liability, the authors suggest that the criterion 
of liability in any particular case is "What does common sense, 
in view of the accepted business and social mores of the com-
munity, entitle one person to expect from another who purports 
to furnish information or make statements for his guidance in a 
business transaction?" The circumstances will indicate to the 
(judge's? jury's?) common sense whether a person of ordinary 
intelligence would be expected to rely upon the actor's state-
ments. In some situations (trade talk) the danger signals are so 
distinct that no person will be permitted to say he relied even on 
the honesty of the statement, because few persons would. In other 
situations a person in plaintiff's position may be "practically justi-
fied in expecting sincerity and honesty ... but nothing further."3 
In still other situations, because "the ethics of business practice" 
justify it, the one may be expected to use reasonable care to avoid 
misleading the other. And finally "there are situations in which 
action is commonly taken in business negotiations in reliance upon 
the assumed existence of certain facts. Business proceeds upon the 
assumption that representations are true." This includes the case 
where the actor's "manner of giving the information constitutes 
such an assumption of complete knowledge that the psychological 
effect upon the other is calculated to divert that self-protective in-
vestigation which might otherwise be made."4 
This is not the place, and I am not now prepared, to criticize 
this rationale in detail. But I doubt that all or even nearly all "trade 
talk" cases have involved situations wherein "common sense" 
would indicate that the ordinarily intelligent buyer or seller 
would have placed no faith in the honesty of his opposite num-
2 Sections 7.4-7.7. 
SP. 541. 
4Ibid. 
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her. I also doubt that the "as of his own knowledge" routine is 
restricted to those situations where the party claiming he has been 
deceived has in fact been disarmed by the assertiveness of the 
other's statement. When vendor says to purchaser that the bound-
ary of the lot which he wishes to sell lies along the line A-B, cer-
tainly the one understands as well as the other, whether the state-
ment is made loudly or softly, in terms of "I know" or only "I 
think," that the most that can be said is "To the best of my knowl-
edge." So although I think the authors' rationale sheds much 
light on these cases in a general way, and is a very distinct aid to 
understanding, I do not believe it to be a case description which 
is accurate in detail. I should not leave the impression that the 
authors claim it is, for they concede that "in some instances . . . 
the case law seems to defy clarification." But I would argue further 
that, if it is deemed desirable to impose upon the decision of ac-
tual cases some sort of control along the lines the authors have 
indicated, taking into consideration the new style aloofness of 
the judge from application of the law to the fa<:ts of the case, 
standards as general as these are much too flabby to do the job. 
The organization of materials in Volume 1 has a distinct ad-
vantage over other recent treatises from the point of view of the 
practicing lawyer. All matters concerning intentional interference 
with the possession and use of land, including trespass and its 
privileges and nuisance, are concentrated in one chapter. One 
who needs to do so, and certainly this is the principal benefit a 
practicing lawyer receives from a treatise, can quickly and pain-
lessly put his problem in context by reading ninety consecutive 
pages of the book, and be relatively certain he has touched all 
bases. To the student or teacher, who is more likely to be interested 
in the generality of a concept, this arrangement is less appropriate 
and involves some repetition in discussion of privilege. It is not, 
however, a serious inconvenience. Negligent injury to land and 
strict liability are of course located elsewhere, but categories as 
large as these are not frequently overlooked. Interference with 
chattels (trespass, conversion, and appropriate privileges) is treated 
in the same way, as is interference with the person. The former 
has received a much more detailed treatment (120 pages) than is 
customary in treatises on torts, which is, in my estimation, a further 
recommendation. 
Volume 2 departs entirely from the black-letter style of horn-
book and restatement and actually constitutes a collection of 
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essays on the various major points connected with what the au-
thors call "accident liability." It is an excellent commentary, and 
nothing which I have to say about it should leave any impression 
to the contrary. Most of these essays again have a familiar look to 
those who have followed Professor James' publications in the 
periodicals, but the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. 
In particular the chapter on Legal Cause comes as close to im-
parting an understanding of that problem as anything in print 
of which I am aware. The traumatized researcher will be com-
forted to encounter here some reassurance in the statement that 
"the fact is that in a great number of situations it makes very little 
difference what test is used." "And in such situations it is obvious 
from even cursory reading of the cases that many courts indulge in 
random, standard definitions of proximate cause merely as a 
'warm-up' exercise; formulas are collected indiscriminately and 
then often accorded no further consideration (by relating them 
to the merits of the case, and the like)."5 The chapters on the 
Nature of Negligence, Function of the Judge and Jury in Negli-
gence Cases, and Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land are 
also particularly helpful. 
The significance of the title chosen for Part Two is explained, 
and the choice justified, by the first three chapters in the volume. 
These chapters the reader should most certainly examine, at an 
early opportunity, for himself, but because they are basic to any 
critique of this part of the treatise their content must be described 
here in some detail. 
The authors are greatly concerned with the number of acci-
dents that occur every year in the United States, with the human 
and economic costs of these accidents to our society, and with the 
random incidence of that cost upon individuals, their families, and 
persons dealing with them, an incidence which, inevitably, is 
highly regressive. They are further concerned with the inadequacy 
of the common law system of tort liability as an instrument for 
dealing rationally with this problem. They compare, unfavorably, 
that system, which requires the injured person to seek compensa-
tion through the judicial process, with all the delays, uncertainties 
and further economic loss which this entails, with the workmen's 
compensation system which provides promptness and certainty of 
award and payment. 
5 P. 1160, n. 48. 
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Their attention next is directed to the causes of accidents in 
modern life. An examination of various studies made in the past 
twenty-five years convinces them that a large proportion of all 
accidents are consequences of "accident proneness"; e.g., statistics 
are quoted which indicate that 4 percent of all drivers cause one 
third of all automobile accidents. Going behind this proposition 
they then give a short summary of conclusions they find in the 
literature as to the causes of accident proneness in various contexts, 
industrial accident, the highway, the home, etc. At this point I 
have some difficulty following the argument. The authors seem 
to conclude that there is relatively little correlation between this 
factor and physical or "psychomotor" characteristics, that there 
is greater correlation with mental attitudes and characteristics 
(depression) anxiety, etc.), and that youth and inexperience are 
associated with a disproportionate number of accidents-a fact 
which they conclude has little significance to their inquiry. They 
wind up with this statement: 6 
"Significant for their absence from the causes of accident 
proneness are 'carelessness' or 'fault.' 'Recent medical research 
has shown that "accident proneness" may be an innate char-
acteristic of some individuals and a personal phenomenon in-
dependent of any question of responsibility, conscious action 
or blameworthiness.' " 
At this point the statement appears quite tentative, and the 
evidence adduced to support it is, for me, less than satisfactory. 
It is important, however, to note it carefully, for it is a leit-
motif that recurs throughout the remainder of the work, the 
foundation for the very extensive critique of modern tort con-
cepts which follows. The absence of "blameworthiness" in the 
personal conduct which causes accidents is the nub. 
The argument next proceeds to a critique of the current con-
cept of the general basis of liability in tort, i.e., of the idea that 
"fault" is a condition of liability and should be a condition of 
liability. They submit first that that fault which is sufficient to 
support an action in negligence does not correspond in fact to 
moral blameworthiness, at least to the extent that the criteria of 
negligence are objective rather than subjective, because the fault 
6 P. 740. In the second sentence the authors are quoting Bristol, "Medical Aspects 
of Accident Control," 107 A.M.A.J. 653 at 654 (1936). 
1958] COMMENT ON The Law of Torts 1297 
principle achieves its general odor of fairness "from the assumption 
that the actor had a choice and of his own free will chose a culpable 
line of conduct and was therefore morally to blame." Hence, to 
compare a man's conduct with an abstract standard when in fact 
he may have been unable to conform because of slow reaction, 
faulty perception, poor judgment or main awkwardness is not 
consistent with the basic assumption. The development of the 
fault criterion of liability is then explained as "another manifesta-
tion of the individualism which underlies laissez faire as a politi-
cal philosophy." "A fleet of trucks cannot be operated, a railroad 
run, or a skyscraper built without the certainty that the enter-
prise will take some toll in human life and limb. It is the very gist 
of the fault principle to privilege the entrepreneur to take this 
toll, so long as the activity is lawful and carried on with reason-
able care."7 
Comparing their conclusions as to the causes of the great bulk 
of all accidents with their concept of morality, the authors con-
clude that the fault principle does not in fact produce results 
which are morally supportable, and that if the law were to be 
further "refined" so as to make liability rest more nearly on per-
sonal blameworthiness the result would be even more indefensible, 
as it would tend to send large numbers of accident victims home 
empty-handed. Their answer to this dilemma is to fall back on a 
"broader moral consideration," "social morality," which calls for 
a distribution of all accident losses over society without regard 
to fault. Naturally such a principle would better serve one ob-
jective of a legal system dealing with accidental loss, compensa-
tion of the victims. Further than this, the authors submit, a strict 
liability system, by bringing into play affirmative remedial conduct 
on the part of insurance companies, industrial corporations, and 
other large loss-bearing units, would be superior to the fault-
based present system in deterring accident-causing conduct. In 
answer to the argument that such a change would place an undue 
economic burden on enterprise they suggest that a system similar 
to workmen's compensation, with fixed limitations on recovery, 
might well be no more expensive than the present law with its 
unlimited liability. 
Finally, in a chapter entitled "The Principle of Social Insur-
7P. 752. 
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ance," the authors produce an additional thought-provoking 
thesis. Fault as a condition of liability is bound up with the as-
sumption, true when it arose, that the lawsuit is a contest between 
the two parties alone, that all that can be accomplished is to shift 
the loss that has occurred from the shoulders of the victim to the 
shoulders of the person who caused it, and that there is no social 
gain from this and no reason for doing it except to satisfy a de-
mand for fairness and deter dangerous conduct. ·"Fairness" in an 
individualist society was identified with the idea that one should 
not be liable in the absence of fault. Today, on the other hand, 
accidental loss presents a much greater problem than it has in the 
past. It falls on the shoulders of people who can ill afford it, and 
the best way to deal with it is to compensate the victim without 
regard to how it occurred and shift the loss not to another indi-
vidual but to society generally, or some large segment of it, thus 
saving the victim from ruin without placing an undue burden 
on the innocent cause. They then proceed to show that our present 
common law system goes farther toward accomplishing this end 
than one might at first suppose. Consider, for instance, the effect 
of such factors as strict liability arising from extrahazardous ac-
tivity, res ipsa loquitur, vicarious liability, compulsory automobile 
insurance, automobile owners' responsibility laws, comparative 
negligence statutes, etc., some of which tend to assure liability 
in the first instance, others of which, combined with the increasing 
prevalence of liability insurance, tend to spread the loss that 
is thus imposed. The total practical effect is augmented by the 
practices of insurance companies themselves, e.g., the broaden-
ing of coverage of policies to include others than the named in-
sured, medical payments provisions, and settlement practices 
(which the authors find tend to assure prompt and adequate com-
pensation without regard to fault to persons suffering minor in-
juries, but do not do the same for major victims). 
This indicates the general basis of their critique, and the gen-
eral outline of the system the authors believe should prevail. An 
acceptable system would (I) assure that all persons injured by 
accident receive at least a basic compensation for that injury. 
That compensation, perhaps, should not include such inflatable 
items as pain and suffering, which the authors do not believe rep-
resent an actual hard-money loss, and should perhaps be arranged 
on an installment basis and subject to limitations in amount, in 
analogy to workmen's compensation, but the contours on this 
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side of the coin are by no means so distinct as on the other. (2) The 
system should be so designed that the ultimate incidence of liabil-
ity would be upon an agency-insurance company; large corpora-
tion, etc.-which could and would distribute the cost widely 
through the instrumentality of price, either of product, service or 
insurance policy. This picture of an ideal state of law is about 
as far as the authors go in the direction of a systematic proposal. 
Approving references are made to such things as the proposals for 
a statutory automobile compensation plan and recent literature 
advocating "enterprise liability," but they have neither a legisla-
tive program nor a systematic accident jurisprudence of their 
own to promote. Only in the product liability field do they advo-
cate that the courts, on their own responsibility, openly depart 
from that principle of liability which they now follow and accept 
instead implied warranty as the basic rule. For the rest, the 
authors are content, having isolated what they consider to be the 
basic oughts, to refer back to them constantly as criteria for 
evaluating the decisions and the rules which make up the corpus 
of the law relating to liability for accidentally-caused injury. As 
I read their book these principles, which are for them basic, can 
be summarized as two slogans, "Let All Accident Victims Be 
Compensated," and "Let The Loss Be Spread." They apparently 
contemplate that with these slogans constantly before them, 
the courts will be able to remake the law themselves. Legal 
questions will be resolved in conscious accordance with the slogans; 
fact questions will be so resolved, consciously or no, in a great 
majority of instances by the jury. 
There remains to be examined the effect which their basic 
assumptions have upon the authors' approach to the substance of 
the law. Every legal principle and the result of every case is ex-
amined through one lens. The principle or decision is good if it 
tends to further the objectives expressed by the slogans. It is 
bad if it seems to look in the other direction-without regard to 
other criteria. The consequence is that with reference to exist-
ing doctrine the authors take a distinctly and professedly am-
bivalent attitude. The principal objective is to make it easy for 
the plaintiff to recover, since the loss-spreading objective can be 
left with a light heart to defendants' instincts of self-preservation. 
With this in mind the authors recognize, rejoice in, and seek to 
exploit the proverbial tendencies of juries. As the jury is a die 
loaded in favor of plaintiff, any rule which tends to send a case 
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to rather than keep it from the jury, or which tends to give the 
jury a wider discretion, is to be approved. Any rule having the 
opposite effect is to be frmvned upon. One of the best means for 
accomplishing this purpose is Brett's magic dictum from Heaven 
v. Pender. This principle, that one owes to another an obligation 
of care in any case when he should realize that his conduct, if not 
carried out with care, will cause danger of injury to that other, 
of course is not and never has been law. The authors would like 
to make it so and in this way override many of the limitations on 
liability which have in the past been phrased in terms of "no duty 
of care." For example, as to the duties of the occupant of land 
toward trespassers they say: ". . . the traditional rule confers on 
an occupier of land a special privilege to be careless which is quite 
out of keeping with the development of accident law generally 
and is no more justifiable here than it would be in the case of 
any other useful enterprise or activity."8 They harbor similar 
opinions concerning the liability of a construction contractor for 
injuries caused by defects in the structure after it has been ac-
cepted by the owner,9 liability for prenatal injuries,10 and problems 
of recovery for injury resulting from negligently caused emotional 
disturbance.11 "It is submitted that these questions will be solved 
most justly by applying general principles of duty and negligence, 
and that mechanical rules of thumb which are at variance with 
these principles do more harm than good." The only limitations 
upon the generality of Brett's dictum which the authors accept as 
part of their ideal jurisprudence, perhaps because they consider 
them not very significant in fact, are the excuse from liability to-
ward the unforeseeable plaintiff and, curiously, for unforeseeable 
type of harm. 
But beyond the duty hurdle lies the breach. Consistently, 
and with complete candor, the authors oppose any restriction 
upon the jury's freedom to deal with the problem. The proposition 
is that the question of negligence, vel non, in any case involves 
only an assessment of the reasonableness of the actor's conduct. 
That is a function assigned to the jury, and any judicial invasion 
of this function by "rules of thumb" or specific standards of con-
SP. 1440. 
9P. 1043. 
10 Pp. 1028-1031. 
llP. 1039. 
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duct ("stop, look and listen," "step in the dark," etc.) is an offense 
not only agains~ the theory of common law trial procedure, but 
also, and for this reason principally to be condemned, in the gen-
erality of its application (including contributory negligence), 
against the compensation slogan. 
Other examples of applying the same criteria to existing doc-
trine, to proposed changes, or to the facts of life in a jury trial 
are their disapproval of vicarious responsibility based upon joint 
enterprise reasoning12 (again because of its application to the con-
tributory negligence issue), their suggestion that the operation 
with the consent of the owner type of statute found in the auto-
mobile accident field be copied with reference to all "dangerous 
instrumentalities,"13 and their joy in the fact that juries custom-
arily disregard instructions on contributory negligence.14 They 
assert and advocate that there is a double standard of negligence 
as between plaintiff and defendant, i.e., that the tendency to relax 
in favor of subjective standards is noticeable only as to plaintiffs.15 
They advocate an objective standard of wanton and willful mis-
conduct, qualified by the proposition that even mere negligence 
may constitute wantonness if accompanied by a wanton state of 
mind. (And what remains of the guest statute when an unre-
strained jury sinks its teeth into this one?) 
This general attitude, which in the instances recited above 
can be related to the proposition that accidents which result from 
conduct which is not morally culpable should nevertheless be 
compensated, carries over into issues of the lawsuit which are not 
directly related to that proposition. For instance, one who be-
lieves that A, who caused an injury to B, should be required to 
pay for it whether he was at fault or not, does not necessarily 
conclude further that a court should bend over backward to make 
it easy for B to prove that he was injured or that the injury was 
caused by A. It must be remembered, however, that the critique 
of fault as the basis of liability is mere inducement. The operative 
principle is the compensation slogan. Therefore the authors' dis-
approval of "rules of thumb" which tend to limit the discretion 
of the jury by imposing standards as to sufficiency of evidence ap-
12 P. 1418. 
13 P. 1!!82. 
14 Pp. 894, 1262. 
15 Pp. 904, 1228. 
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plies with reference to proof of cause in fact and damages, as well 
as to proof of negligence, contributory negligence, etc. Res ipsa 
loquitur, and its recent fancy California offspring, Ybarra v. Span-
gard and Summers v. Tice, "never had it so good." 
And so it goes. There is no neutralism here. The authors have 
a p(?sition on everything, and their position is as predictable as 
the hour the sun will rise. Because of their consistency, their 
willingness to follow their basic assumptions as far as they will 
carry, and because of the relentless logic and penetrating analysis 
which they bring to bear in the process, it is a position which 
is difficult to attack. This is particularly true for the reader who 
has not so precisely isolated and identified the basic assumptions 
upon which rests his own ideology of tort liability. I believe it 
is essential, however, that an attempt be made, for, in the legal 
literature of the day, judicial and extra-judicial alike, I hear very 
clearly the strains of the bandwagon. 
First, let me carve out an area of agreement, or at least of nolo 
contendere. I agree that the accident problem in America is a most 
serious problem, and that the sum total of human misery would 
be distinctly reduced if it were not necessary for the unfortunate 
victims to shoulder the burden all by themselves. I would sup-
pose, however, that the great bulk of the more serious accidents 
of a type appropriate to tort liability occur in one of two contexts, 
industrial employment and automobile use. The :first of these two 
categories is already, for the most part, treated in accordance with 
the authors' theories, and I am not inclined to argue that the 
second should not be. The sheer bulk of the automobile accident 
problem is such that unusual measures are suggested. Conceivably, 
· as Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested, the liability insurers, by 
progressively increasing the coverage of their policies, will solve 
this problem for us. If they have such ambitions, they should 
certainly be encouraged. If they do not, the next question, pre-
sumably, is whether a compensation scheme analogous to work-
men's compensation is feasible. That is a question which can 
hardly be answered ex cathedra and would seem to be addressed 
more appropriately to the legislature than to the judiciary. Pos-
sibly analogous action would be appropriate in other accident con-
texts. But what of the argument that the courts, absent legislative 
action, should manipulate their conduct of litigation· in such a 
way as to tend to bring about the desired end? 
An example of the authors' point of view on a particular prob-
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lem which illustrates how far they are willing to go is their posi-
tion with reference to the common law misfeasance-nonfeasance 
distinction. Remember, the basic objective is compensation. The 
means to the end is the discountenancing of restrictions upon the 
jury. The rule that a person who is in no way responsible for 
another's peril has no duty to render assistance to the one im-
perilled is viewed as "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, 
individualism" which the courts have increasingly tended to re-
strict in scope. The rule of Union Pacific R. Co. v. Cappier,16 
whereby there is no duty to render assistance even if the plaintiff's 
injury is caused by the defendant's non-negligent conduct, is ex-
pressly disapproved, on the ground that "there is a growing be-
lief that the beneficiaries of an enterprise which creates risks should 
pay for the casualties it inflicts without regard to fault. It is a 
lesser burden, by far, to impose on the beneficiaries the milder 
duty of furnishing reasonable rescue or first aid. This is simply 
requiring a man to minimize the consequences of risks which 
society gives him the privilege to create."17 The authors then point 
out a number of respects in which they conceive the basic rule 
has been limited in recent cases, from which they find to their 
own satisfaction that a "trend" exists, and argue finally: 18 
"It may not be long before some pioneering court will take 
the further step urged by Ames some fifty years ago. Plain-
tiff has been injured by defendant's inexcusable failure to 
act under circumstances wherein action would be effective, 
easy, and commanded by every social and moral consideration. 
The real basis of objection to liability is that the law should 
not try to enforce unselfishness or make one man serve his 
fellows. In a society whose values are still significantly indi-
vidualistic, this objection deserves great weight. But, we 
submit, those values would be properly safeguarded under 
Ames's rule by its careful limitations and its coincidence 
with the universal moral judgment of our society." [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
I respectfully submit that the authors are here guilty of the 
same fallacy which they have criticized in other contexts, that 
of thinking of the rules of tort law as rules of human conduct rath-
16 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903). 
17P. 1047. 
lSP. 1049. 
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er than as mere criteria for adjudication between two parties of a 
claim for money. Part of their critique of the fault principle is that 
it involves an assumption that legal liability will deter faulty con-
duct, an assumption which they question. It seems quite clear to 
me that nobody, with the possible exception of a timid lawyer or 
a malpractice-sensitive doctor, will be influenced in his actual 
conduct by the rule which here prevails, whichever way it goes. 
The bystanders at the scene of a drowning or other tragedy are 
not likely to consult attorneys before acting or withholding action. 
The problem, then, is not whether the law should try to make 
man serve his fellows, but whether Joe Smith, who did not, or 
rather as to whom-if the evidence were interpreted most strongly 
in favor of the plaintiff-it would be possible to say that he did 
not react with the promptness and competence that he should 
have displayed, should be subjected to the peril that a jury, ex-
ercising its ex post facto discretion perhaps years after the event, 
will require him to pay for X's misfortune. Even in the authors' 
own frame of reference, I have never been able to understand 
why Joe Smith rather than X should pay the premiums on this 
insurance. X would have suffered the same misfortune if Smith 
had never been born. 
The rule here under attack is one which is intimately asso-
ciated with what remains of the autonomy of the individual. To 
say that society should succor the unfortunate is one thing. To say 
that George should have done it, and if he did not he should be 
made to smart, is quite another. The authors' response is that 
there is no real difficulty because the rule which would impose 
liability can be suitably hedged, e.g., "defendant might be held 
only where a reasonable man would have realized plaintiff's grave 
danger, and lack of danger to himself, and where reasonably ef-
fective means of rescue were easily accessible as defendant knew 
or should have known, etc."19 And this, of course, is the conven-
tional argument for razing any of the common law barriers to 
liability. They are made to appear out of line, out of date, ir-
rational, arbitrary, and one is assured that no danger will accom-
pany their removal because there will be substituted only the 
usual standard of reasonable conduct. So it is said of all the "rules 
of thumb" and duty limitations. It is sought only to impose the 
19P. 1046, n. 9. 
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normal responsibility for conduct, and no man will ?e held liable 
unless his conduct was unreasonable. This argument, of course, 
assumes away the whole problem. It becomes a mockery when, 
as here, the proponents have elsewhere maintained that all these 
questions must be left to the jury and that juries automatically 
find for plaintiff. To overturn this rule means that A who merely 
walks down the street subjects himself to the peril that he will 
encounter a situation which will permit X to sue him and take 
his all because, with the help of clever counsel, X can persuade 
a jury that A did not make use of reasonably effective means of 
rescue which were, as A knew or should have known, easily ac-
cessible to him. In my opinion it is a reckless suggestion and 
would have no effective limitation. It could, however, operate quite 
effectively to blanket in under the system a large segment of ac-
cidental loss that might otherwise go uncompensated because it 
could not be attributed to the affirmative conduct of any conceiv-
able defendant. 
These instances will suffice to suggest the ultimate implica-
tions of the book. I raise my voice in dissent for a number of 
reasons. Starting from the assumption that individual accidental 
losses are losses to society, and compensation of such loss is a social 
gain, the authors conclude that society should take affirmative 
steps to guarantee that the compensation will occur. In passing, 
we might point out that there is no essential difference in this 
respect between accidental loss and any other kind of loss. The 
individual and society will be handicapped to the same extent 
by disability which results from illness as by that which results 
from accident, by economic loss from natural causes as by loss 
from accident, and, for that matter, the individual whose im-
pecuniousness results from his own improvidence or incapacity, 
or from the vagaries of the economy, labors under a handicap not 
different in kind from that which, in the instance of accidental 
injury, the authors seek to remedy by means of the money judg-
ment. It may be a pertinent inquiry, therefore, whether if one 
starts with such comprehensive objectives there is any reason to 
consider accidental loss as a peculiar problem. It is only one of 
the elements of distributional inequality in any social system which 
is not the embodiment of the principle "to each according to his 
needs." I do not mean to imply that it is impossible or undesirable 
to seek the remedy of one ill while others are left unattended. 
I do suggest, however, that the system the authors contemplate, 
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using their own basic assumptions as the criteria, would be in-
complete, both internally and externally. There would be a pro-
portion of accidental losses which would be uncompensated, if 
for no other reason than that the unfortunate plaintiff would 
find himself in the increasingly improbable position of being able 
to find nobody to blame but himself. There would also be large 
categories of loss, not accidental in origin but of an equal signifi-
cance to society, which would be untouched by the system. 
Aside from this, the "loss distribution" aspect of the system 
is a naked assumption, the validity of which there is reason to 
doubt.20 The ability of a given defendant to pass on the loss 
imposed upon it would depend in large part upon extrinsic fac-
tors such as the general condition of the economy, the defendant's 
competitive position, etc. The distribution, therefore, would ac-
tually occur in an uneven manner, with the consequence that to 
a greater or less degree in individual instances the loss would 
rest exactly where it was imposed by the court. If this fact is com-
bined with the natural consequence of the authors' allocation 
of function between judge and jury, a capricious original incidence 
of liability, the resultant it seems to me is indefensible. , 
A statutory insurance scheme designed to cover medical costs 
and permanent disability arising from accidental causes, supported 
in some measure out of tax funds, would be a more logical der-
ivative of the authors' basic assumptions. There would be more 
complete coverage, the recovery could be subjected to reasonable 
controls, and less violence would be done to the integrity of the 
common law system. If universal compensation is the objective, 
should it not be accomplished through a scheme that would com-
pensate the loss without forcing upon plaintiff and his counsel 
the undignified beating of the bushes for a "connectible" defend-
ant? Furthermore, it seems perfectly reasonable to refer such a 
problem as we have here to the legislative power which, let us 
hope, still has some function to perform in the establishment of 
such broad policy as we are here discussing. Such a referral, though 
it may be more typical of the nineteenth century than of our 
emancipated modern courts, would also be a test of the authors' 
assumption that the behavior patterns of juries in individual cases 
20 Plant, "Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Prod• 
ucts," 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 at 946 (1957). 
1958] COMMENT ON The Law of Torts 1307 
are strong evidence of a deep-seated popular feeling of need for 
drastic change in the law. 
In other words, as it seems to me, one who shares the authors' 
basic assumptions that the most important function of tort law 
is to assure compensation might well be repelled by the way in 
which the authors contemplate this objective should ultimately 
be achieved. Their system would be stigmatized by gross inequali-
ties of treatment as between injured persons and as between de-
fendants and, so far as I can see, by an unsystematic and fortuitous 
distribution of the cost burden. It would involve imposition of 
liability which in many cases would have a heavily punitive effect 
upon individuals as well as upon business organizations (whose 
feelings are not worthy of consideration) in many instances where 
the person mulcted would quite reasonably have no feeling of 
responsibility whatever for what had occurred-indeed, as in the 
occupant of land cases, he might well feel that he himself was 
the injured party. 
In large measure the authors seem to advocate that the courts 
substitute for the traditional framework of decision in accident 
cases one guiding principle-legal questions shall be so resolved 
as to advance the principle of universal compensation. This prin-
ciple is to be applied, not only to the interpretation of judicial 
precedent, but also to the construction of statutes, although the 
consequence is a light regard for statutory language.21 If a court 
should consciously follow their urgings in toto, its doing so would 
involve an assumption of legislative powers considerably more 
grandiose than those, even, to which we have become accustomed. 
If it is competent for a court to make such decisions, must we not 
recognize the possibility that other persons may have other views 
as to what should be the guiding principle of tort law and, if so, 
must they not have their days in court? Should we then be sur-
prised if the lobby forms just outside the judge's chambers? Is a 
trial, or at least an appellate argument, to take on the aspect of 
a legislative committee hearing? Without the paraphernalia of · 
the legislative committee, can it be argued that a court is equipped 
to make decisions such as these? Is there nothing involved here 
but a philosophical principle which can be accepted simply on the 
basis of one's own intellectual conviction of its validity, supported 
by the abstract arguments of a legal treatise? 
21 Wrongful death statute, p. 1333; sales act, p. 1576; guest statute, p. 961. 
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A greater probability is that courts which have no such gran-
diose ambitions may, without realizing the full implications of 
their actions, accomplish the same end by accepting the urgings 
of these authors in many seemingly minor details. There are 
many places where their arguments based upon the compensation 
principle are reinforced by aesthetic principles, and where for 
that reason a court is most likely to give way. The result will be 
to accelerate a development already underway which carries the 
marks of a remaking, not only of the jurisprudence of this country, 
but of the entire fabric of political control. The potentiality of 
this change has always been with us by reason of our carefully 
nurtured illusion that "the common law" is one system. This 
fiction was innocuous enough when stare decisis was a conviction 
of sufficient strength to impose a degree of discipline upon the 
law of the separate jurisdictions. That restraining hand is being 
shaken off, however, as the courts begin to take seriously what 
they have been told about their "legislative powers." When this 
happens, and the commanding sound of its own voice out of the 
past fades into the background, a court feels most strongly the 
need for a means of deciphering the scrambled message from the 
other forty-eight jurisdictions. The consequence is an ever-increas-
ing judicial reliance upon the treatise, restatement or monograph, 
the work of a "systematizer" who by his very nature is subject to an 
extreme degree to the pressure of an idea. The judge of the old 
school conceived of his function in terms of marginal differentia-
tion between cases. His differentiations, of course, had a discretion-
ary quality, but the discretion was exercised on an ad hoc basis, 
within the general framework of earlier decision, and had, there-
fore, an effectively if not distinctly circumscribed scope. The meth-
od has its disadvantages; its product is likely to be untidy, at best, 
and the trees may frequently obscure the wood. But surely it is the 
very essence of the common law aspect of our political system and 
the basis of our willingness to live in large measure free of a 
"written law." These limited acts of discretion we have been con-
tent to leave to the magistrate, conscious of the necessity which 
requires it, and confident that the great decisions which estab-
lish and change broad policies and determine the essential fram-
work of society will be made by the elected political representa-
tives over whom we exercise a direct control. The "systematizer," 
however, is subject to such a limitation only to the extent that he 
chooses voluntarily to recognize it and, because of his remote view 
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and intellectual compulsion to generalize, he will tend to a 
greater or lesser degree to reject it. Furthermore, because he has 
no home jurisdiction and can be selective about the authority he 
chooses to "follow," and because in the reports of the more than 
half a hundred common law jurisdictions he can find authority, 
direct or analogical, for almost any position he may wish to take, 
the ideal system he derives is in fact his system-a set of concepts 
constructed around and designed to effectuate his own views as to 
the basic policy of the law-though it is clothed with the appear-
ance of judicial parenthood. So compiled and so shaped it goes 
back to the courts, who accept it as the product of enlightened 
opinion and, because they no longer feel bound by their own 
earlier decisions and do not wish to be thought backward, as the 
guide for decision in litigated cases. Undoubtedly great progress 
has occurred in our jurisprudence, made possible by these very 
facts. So long as the changes made are corrective in nature, in-
volving "legislation" of approximately the same amplitude as 
that which we have customarily committed to our courts, the 
effect is probably largely beneficial. I submit, however, that when 
appellate courts in the exuberance of their newly-recognized free-
dom to make the small decisions begin to operate upon the as-
sumption that they are equally free to make the great decisions_. 
they exceed the scope of their warrant. 
The subject of this discussion, however, is not the court 
which sees itself as a super-legislature, but rather the court which, 
because it no longer feels itself strictly bound by its earlier deci-
sions, tends for that reason to give greater weight than it has in 
the past to outside authority, on a case by case basis. The constant 
aesthetic urge to reorganize the law in accordance with ever 
broader generalizations mingles with these authors' primary com-
pensation principle to produce the greatest pressure upon tradi-
tional common law rules at those points where their contours are 
not regular. In negligence law the great generalizations are Brett's 
dictum at the duty level and the definition of negligent conduct in 
terms of a departure from a jury-determined norm of reasonable-
ness at the breach level. Thus any "no duty rule" not based upon 
the scope of foreseeable danger, and any "rule of thumb" which 
subtracts from the jury's power to determine the "reasonableness" 
of the parties' conduct, not only tend to defeat compensation in 
some cases but also are aberrational in terms of the aesthetic prin-
ciple and therefore to be decried by all right thinking jurists. The 
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judge who yields to these point-by-point pressures will be con-
vinced that he is vindicating rather than working against the com-
mon law tradition. If you accept the compensation principle as 
the controlling criterion of liability in tort you will not be both-
ered by this. If you are still so medieval in your outlook as to _be-
lieve that criterion must be defined in terms of some other concept 
or view of justice, you may be, because the irregularities of contour 
which are now being "rectified" were the product not only of judi-
cial respect for the autonomy of the individual, but also of judi-
cial realism as to the validity of the results the courts could hope 
to achieve. 
There is much more at stake here than superficially appears, 
for a "law" of negligence derived from such all-encompassing gen-
eralizations as these is not a system of law at all, but only a con-
ceptual conduit through which all cases are funneled into the 
jury room. The trial judge, whose will to direct a verdict for 
·insufficiency of evidence is rapidly being beaten down by the 
appellate courts,22 by these two related developments will lose all 
· opportunity to control the outcome of the case. The articulated 
principles of law, whatever may be their content, will appear only 
as instructions to the jury, and hence will have at most a precatory 
· effect. The actual criteria for the adjudication of the claim will 
be solely those which the par.ticular jury, in the individual case, 
chooses in its uncontrolled discretion to apply in the secrecy of 
the jury room, unencumbered by the embarrassing necessity of 
explaining its decision. This, of course, has always been true to 
some extent, but so long as there was available to the judge a 
selection of devices for disposing of the case without or despite 
a jury verdict, the consequences could be kept within tolerable 
limits, i.e., within that group of cases where reasonable men really 
22 The lead in this movement is being assumed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in cases arising under the FELA. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 
(1957); Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); Ferguson v. -Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957). While these cases themselves involved not the reversal 
of verdicts directed by trial courts, but rather the reversal of appellate decisions that 
the verdict should have been directed, the conclusion of one who examines them must 
he that it is a rare case indeed in which a directed verdict for defendant will stand. 
Although the Court's position here is partly accounted for by its desire to reform the 
particular statute, there is no reason to believe the extreme position here taken on the 
function of the jury will ,be limited to FELA cases. Consider, for instance, Hopkins v. 
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 930, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Washington, which attracted the support .of three other circuit judges in 
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 23 at 34. 
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could fairly disagree, and where the litigants, therefore, could 
have no real basis for complaint whichever view prevailed. This 
involved only an acceptance of the inevitable. It is a far different 
proposition if all cases in which plaintiff is able to satisfy the re-
quirement of the more "liberal" contemporary courts that he 
produce a token of evidence of negligent conduct which "played 
a part"23 in causing his injury are on such showing to be turned 
over to the jury for disposition. To me this involves a shocking 
abdication of judicial responsibility which is in no measure made 
more commendable by the fact that its proponents see it as an 
indirect approach to a basis of liability in tort which they deem 
preferable to that recognized in the past. 
It is, then, entirely possible that without being conscious 
of what we are doing we may jettison completely the intricate 
system by which our forebears sought to achieve a modicum of 
what we have called "rule of law" in favor of one by which dis-
putes between individuals will be committed to the uncontrolled 
discretion of the tribunal. And the tribunal, here, is not a trained 
and experienced magistrate, full of years and wisdom. It is the 
common law jury, a device which, for the ascertainment of truth, 
is removed but by two steps from trial by ordeal and by one from 
the wager of law. There are those who view this as the ultimate 
flowering of the democratic method, and for that reason as a 
desirable development. I do not. 
The judges of an earlier day were modest in the claims they 
were willing to make for the law of torts. They did not conceive 
that it was their mission to sally forth to remedy all the ills of 
society armed only with the money judgment. There were areas 
of conflict between persons where, by reason of the limitations of 
their techniques, they frankly feared to tread, recognizing the 
danger that their interference, in the long run and in the gen-
erality of cases, would work more harm than good. They under-
stood juries as well as Messrs. Harper and James, and because 
they assumed that their function was, to the extent possible, to 
do justice according to law between plaintiff and defendant, they 
worked out a system of checks and balances between judge and 
jury so that that objective could at least be approached. To my 
23 Apparently now established as the test for cause in fact in FELA cases. See the 
Supreme Court opinions cited in note 22, and Thomson v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 353 
U.S. 926 (1957) 
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mind that modesty of objectives was and is sound. To my mind, 
further, a jurisprudence which contemplates that the judiciary 
shall, on the one hand, assume the burden of legislating to the 
extent of radically changing the broad and far-reaching under-
lying policy of the law, and on the other hand shall abdicate 
completely to the jury the function of applying that Policy to the 
case at hand, is not. Its · substantial acceptance by the courts 
would, it seems to me, subject to grave question the continuing 
validity of the common law system itself. 
